# SOUTH AFRICA

## Afrikaners

Activity: 1973-2020

**General notes**

* The Afrikaners are also referred to as Boers.

**Movement start and end dates**

* The earliest evidence for separatist mobilization we could find is in 1973, when the Afrikaner Weerstands Beweging (AWB) was formed (Afrikaner Resistance Movement in English). The AWB’s goal was the creation of an independent state for Afrikaners/Boers separate from South Africa. It formed the Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF, Afrikaner People’s Front in English) with other right-wing parties in 1993 as a result of far-right wing resistance to the 1994 general election. The AWB remained active as of 2020, when it had ca. 5,000 members. The group has had several armed wings of varying size and importance, with the best known one being the ‘Iron Guard’ (‘Ystergarde’ in Afrikaans), the branch which has been held responsible for most of the movement’s violent activities (Campbell 2020; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia; O’Malley; AWB webpage).
* Another separatist organization is Vereniging van Oranjewerkers, which was founded in 1980 as a research group exploring new ways to implement the old ideas of apartheid and the creation of a Volkstaat/Boerestaat (du Toit 1991: 646-651).
* Freedomfront Plus, another organization founded in 1994, makes lesser claims for increased cultural rights and autonomy (Freemdomfront Plus webpage).
* Another separatist organization was Group of 63, which was founded in May 2000. Group 63 mainly primarily asked the government to recognize and protect the Afrikaans language and Afrikaner institutions. However, a faction also pursued internal self-rule or even an independent Volkstaat/Boerestaat. It seems that the Group of 63 was no longer active as of 2020.
* Another (ongoing) separatist organization is Pro-Afrikaanse Aksiegroep (Praag), which was founded in 2010 and promotes an Afrikaan nation (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Minahan 2002; MAR; Praag).
* In 2007, the Cape Independence Party was formed. The party has had modest, but increasing electoral success. In the 2009 South African general elections, the party received 2,552 votes in the provincial elections. That number increased to 9,331 votes in 2019 (0.45% of votes in the province). In the 2021 municipal elections, the Cape Party obtained 17,881 votes. The party’s membership rose from 1,000 to 10,000 by 2017 (cf. Minahan 2016: 90). The Cape Independence Party, and its associated campaign for an independence referendum (CapeXit) brand themselves as an ethnically inclusive independence movement for the Western and Northern Cape provinces; however, their platform also includes railings against alleged systematic racism against White people in South Africa. We therefore include the Capers movement under the Afrikaners. [start date: 1973; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Secession was the dominant claim until the mid-1990s. The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), a far-right Afrikaners secessionist organization, was formed in 1973, was growing strongly and had almost 70,000 members in the 1980s. In 1993, before the first multi-racial general election, the Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF, Afrikaner People’s Front in English), which was a secessionist umbrella organisation uniting several right-wing Afrikaner organizations including AWB, was formed as a result of right-wing resistance to the election (SAHO 2011). [1973-1994: independence claim]
* The dominant claim reverted to greater autonomy after the 1994 election, when AVF lost support. fractured internally, and was ultimately disbanded in 1996. AWB continued to exist and make claims for secession, but its support waned and several other, more moderate Afrikaner nationalist emerged which made claims for increased internal autonomy including the Freedom Front Plus (formed in 1994) and the Group of 63 (formed in 2000). Limited support for independence is confirmed by Minahan (2002: 50f) who also states that only a small group demands independence whereas the majority wants “some form of cultural autonomy” and “territorial self-determination in a federal South Africa”. This is also confirmed by Vestergaard (2001: 32).
* New secessionist organizations emerged in 2007 (Cape Independence Party) and 2010 (Praag), but according to Roth (2015: 291f) Boer secessionists are marginal. [1995-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1973; end date: ongoing]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Afrikaners have proposed various homeland territories, which range from a number of different territories in the east (within the former territories of “Boerestaat” including Transvaal and Orange Free State), to the “Volksstaat” in the Northern and Western Cape provinces. The former claim was the most prominent before 1994, as it was proposed by Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB). The latter claim has been the most prominent after 1994, as it was proposed by organizations such as the Freedom Front Plus and the Volkstaat council (Roth 2015: 291-292). We code the Boerestaat and Volkstaat territory based on the map in Roth (2015: 288).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* According to UCDP, AWB was involved in violence against civilians in the early 1990s. UCDP/PRIO treats this as one-sided violence, hence we do not code separatist violence.
* The Europeans’ rebellion score is 3 in 1996 (‘Europeans’ are a MAR group including both the Afrikaners and the English-speakers). It is not clear why this code was assigned; the only incident that could be interpreted as involving violence noted in MAR’s coding notes (group chronology) is the following: “Nov 15, 1996: Pagad was becoming more militant in recent months and had begun to target journalists whom it now regards as the enemy along with drug lords and peddlers. The Muslim-based group warned the media to stop focusing on the role of Qibla, a militant Muslim organization, and how it supports Pagad. (Africa News Service [ANS] & Reuters).” However, PAGAD (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs) is a vigilante group formed in 1996 in Cape Town that draws its support mainly from Muslim Coloreds. Thus we do not code 1996 as LVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Afrikaners are descendants of protestant Dutch, Germans and French Huguenots, commonly known as Boers, that settled in southern Africa during the long colonial period but mostly during the period of administration by the Dutch East India Company from 1652 to 1795. As wandering farmers hostile to both the indigenous and the colonial government, they developed their own language (Afrikaans) and distinct sub-culture of self-sufficient patriarchal communities (Minahan 2002: 48; UNPO).
* In 1795 the British occupied the Cape and in 1806 control was entirely handed over to the British. Liberal British policies, the revoking of Dutch as an official language, and the freeing of slaves led to great resentment of the new colonial power by the Afrikaners and made a lot of them move north out of British jurisdiction (“Great Trek”), where they established autonomous states (Transvaal, Oranje Vrystaat (Orange Free State), Natal (Natalia)). In 1852 and 1854, the British recognized the independence of Transvaal and Oranje Vrystaat. The discovery of gold in the Afrikaner settlements in 1867 attracted a large amount of British settlers. The influx led to tensions between Afrikaners and the British, who were refused civil rights by the Boer governments. After two British-Boer wars, the Afrikaner republics were annexed but shortly after, Transvaal (1906) and Oranje Vrystaat (1907) were granted an autonomous government. In 1910 they were merged with the British South African territories to form the Union of South Africa.
* After the Second World War, the Afrikaners gained complete control of the government. Their restrictive and repressive policy of apartheid (instituted in 1948) led to an increasing isolation of South Africa in the world.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* After the end of apartheid and with the 1994 general election – the first in which people from all races were allowed to vote – the influence of the Afrikaners was reduced significantly. This development is reflected in the downgrade of the Afrikaners to junior partner in power access variable. However, there is no evidence that the end of apartheid also led to a decrease in territorial self-determination or a cultural restriction.
* In April 1994, just before general election, the Freedom Front, the African National Congress (ANC) and the National Party-led South African government signed the Accord on Afrikaner Self-determination. In the accord the parties agreed to address the idea of Afrikaner self-determination, including the concept of a Volkstaat. Furthermore, the possibility of local and/or regional self-determination were explicitly not excluded. Overall, with the accord the government agreed to consider Afrikaner self-determination; clearly, though, the accord did not grant any self-determination to a geographically defined territory (Davies 2009).
* In 1992, the Afrikaner-only town of Kleinfontein was founded and recoginised as a cultural community by its provincial government (Gauteng) in 2013. In 1995, another Afrikaner-only town of Orania in Northern Cape was granted a measure of autonomy through the establishment of a transnational representative council. In line with the codebook, changes in municipal autonmy are not coded. Notably, these concessions concerned an “extremely small number” of Afrikaners (Minahan 20002: 51). Kleinfontein had approx. 1,200 inhabitants as of 2017 (Segalov 2017) and Orania approx. 2,500 inhabitants as of 2018 (The Times 2022). According to Minahan (2016: 9), the population of Afrikaner is 3.5-4 million. The great majority of Afrikaners thus did not experience an increase in their level of self-determination.

**Regional autonomy**

* In 1994 the interim constitution, which devolved significant competencies to the nine provinces, entered into force. The 1996 constitution maintained the quasi-federal structure (Dickovick 2007). However, since the Afrikaners are dispersed across South Africa and are not sufficiently represented in regional executive organs (EPR, see Vogt 2015), we do not code them as regionally autonomous. According to the 2001 census, Afrikaners made up between 1.2% (KwaZulu-Natal) and 23% (Eastern Cape) of the provincial population. In all other states except the Eastern Cape, the percentage of Afrikaners is at around 10% or lower. The influence of Afrikaners in the Eastern Cape provincial government could fulfill the criteria of regional autonomy as coded here, but since the Afrikaners in Eastern Cape make up less than 6% of the entire Afrikaner population of South Africa, we do not code it. [no regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Afrikaners |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Afrikaners |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 56001000 |

**Power access**

* We adopt EPR codes. [1973-1994: dominant; 1995-2019: junior partner; 2020: senior partner]

**Group size**

* We adopt EPR codes. [0.08]

**Regional concentration**

* Minahan (2002) suggests that the Afrikaners are not territorially concentrated according to our criteria, though he does not give exact figures. EPR codes them as geographically concentrated, but applies different criteria and a lower threshold than we do in this dataset. MAR I-IV and MAR V (which code all Europeans), on the other hand, do not code them as regionally concentrated (primarily urbans or minority in one region; no regional base). Hewitt and Cheetham (2000) state that the Afrikaners are a local majority in only a few small areas. Overall, the evidence suggests that the Afrikaners do not fulfill our criteria of geographic concentration. [not regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to Minahan (2002), there are around 150,000 Afrikaners in Namibia and smaller numbers in Zimbabwe, Zambia, and other neighboring states. The presence of ethnic kin is confirmed by EPR, which codes the EPR groups Europeans in Zimbabwe, and the Whites in Botswana and Namibia as ethnic kin. Finally, also MAR codes ethnic kin, namely the Europeans in Zimbabwe and Namibia. [kin in neighboring country]

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## East Caprivians

Activity: 1989-1990

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1989 the United Democratic Party (UDP) was formed to advocate Caprivi secession. We peg the start date to 1989. Caprivi is located in today’s Namibia. The movement remained active when Namibia seceded from the Republic of South Africa in 1990 (Keesing’s; Lexis Nexis; Marshal & Gurr 2003; MAR; United Democratic Party). [start date: 1989; end date: host change (1990)]

**Dominant claim**

* The primary advocate of East Caprivian self-determination is the United Democratic Party (UDP), formed in 1989. The UDP advocated Caprivi secession (UDP 2005). Massó Guijarro (2013) also describes the establishment of an independent East Caprivian state as the primary goal of the movement. The fact that the East Caprivian movement in Namibia (coded as of 1990) also demanded secession, is further evidence in this regard. [1989-1990: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1989; end date: host change (1990)]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the UDP consists of the Caprivi Strip, a thin strip of land stretching from eastern Namibia into Zambia (MAR; Roth 2015: 282). The Caprivi Strip covers Mukwe, Kongola, Linyandi, Sibinda, Katima Muliro Rural, Kabe. We code this claim using GIS data on administrative units from the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence in 1989-1990, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* In the pre-colonial period, Caprivi was part of Bulozi (Barotseland), a Lozi kingdom (Minahan 2002: 1116f; UDP 2005). In 1889, the British South Africa Company established a protectorate in Barotseland. In 1890, the Lozi kingdom was partitioned when the Caprivi strip, named after [German Chancellor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chancellor_of_Germany_%28German_Reich%29) Leo von Caprivi, was annexed to German South West Africa in 1890 in order to give the Germans access to Germany’s other colony Tanganyika on Africa’s east coast. The Germans installed indirect rule over the region and in exchange for payment of taxes, most areas ruled by the traditional leaders were respected (Massó Guijarro 2013).
* German rule did not last very long. In 1915, Germany was defeated by the Union of South Africa in the South West Africa campaign in the First World War. Then, a League of Nations mandate officially placed South West Africa under South Africa (Minorities at Risk). However, its remoteness, difficulties of communication and transport as well as the high risk of malaria let the Caprivians retain a relatively high degree of autonomy compared to the rest of the annexed territory (Massó Guijarro 2013).
* In 1971, the ‘tribal governments’ of the Mafwe and Masubia were recognized by South African Government Declaration R261 in 1971. The other groups in the territory remained under the leadership of the Mafwe (Massó Guijarro 2013: 341). The establishment of East Caprivi as a self-governing homeland (Bantustan) predominantly served the purpose of making South Africa a republic in which only white people featured as citizens.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* With Namibia’s independence in 1990, Caprivi lost its status as a Bantustan. Minahan (2002: 1119) suggests that this meant that the Caprivis thereby lost “considerable self-government”. This is a borderline case as it can be questioned whether losing self-government in the context of South Africa’s racist Apartheid system can be considered an autonomy restriction. The dissolution of Bantuastans was initiated in 1989 (see Basters). Note: it is is ambiguous whether the restriction was imposed before or after the SDM’s emergence. [1989: autonomy restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

* The homelands and the policy of separate development served the purpose of making South Africa a republic in which only white people featured as citizens. The establishment of self-government in the homelands, which deprived its black South African residents of almost all their rights as South African citizens, is thus very far from the concept of regional autonomy we are interested in. Thus, we do not code autonomy in 1989.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Became part of Namibia in 1990. [1990: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | East Caprivians |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Blacks |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 56005000 |

**Power access**

* According to MAR, the East Caprivians consist of three groups, all of which are sub-groups of the Lozis: the Mafwe, the Subiya (or Basubias or Masubias), and the Mayeye (also see Minahan 2002: 1116). EPR does not code the Lozis or any of the sub-groups, but only a black umbrella group, suggesting an n:1 scenario. Given that all non-Afrikaner groups were excluded from political power until 1994 (all groups coded discriminated until 1989 and powerless in 1990), we also code the East Caprivians as discriminated in 1989 and powerless in 1990. [1989: discriminated] [1990: powerless]

**Group size**

* See East Caprivians in Namibia. [0.002]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1115), the East Caprivians make up 78% of their homeland, and close to 80% of the East Caprivians in Namibia live there. MAR and EPR also suggest regional concentration. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* MAR codes close kindred in another country which adjoins the East Caprivians' regional base. This kin group are the Lozi (Barotse) who are mainly located in Zambia. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Khoisans

Activity: 1996-2020

**General notes**

* [Khoisan](http://www.khoisan.org) refers to two groups with similar genetic ancestry, shared languages, and cultural values but different forms of livelihood: the pastoral Khoikhoi and the hunter-gatherer San. The two groups are commonly referred to and refer to themselves as Khoisans (Le Fleur and Jansen 2013). It should be mentioned though that it is also argued that the Khoi and the San should be treated separately and that the word Khoisan was a foreign term created by European settlers (Thompson 2018; Secorum 2018).

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1995, “South African Khoisan people attended United Nations conferences to make their presence known to the world. They succeeded in speaking for themselves rather than being spoken for by the South African Government and were recognized as the first indigenous peoples of Africa” (Garman 2001). It seems that the earliest San organization was founded in 1996 – the South African San Institute was established in April 1996 in affiliation with the Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa, which aims to fight for language, culture, traditions, and land rights of the Khoisan. The founding of these two organizations coincided with a “Khoisan Revivalism” or “Khoisan Renaissance,” in which issues include “the right to assert their own identity and not have identity imposed on them… and the restitution of traditional lands” (Garman 2001). 1996 is coded as start date. The movement remains ongoing as the Khoisan fight for land rights and cultural rights with the Khoi and Boesman National Assembly at the helm of the self-determination movement (The Guardian 2010); there have been yearly protests along with some calls for autonomy (BBC 2016; Dean & Levi 2003; Khoisan peoples; Majavu 2013; Smith 2010; South African Government News Agency; South African San Institute). [start date: 1996; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The South African San Institute advocates land rights as well as linguistic and cultural rights for the Khoisans. This claim is also represented by the “Khoisan Revivalism” or the “Khoisan Renaissance”, in which issues include “the right to assert their own identity and not have identity imposed on them… and the restitution of traditional lands” (Garman 2001). Land rights as the dominant claim is confirmed by a number of other sources, such as The Guardian (2010), Le Fleur and Jansen (2013), and Khoisanpeoples.org (a partnership of human rights organizations and groups around the world who support the rights of the Khoisans). The claim was also mentioned by Chief !Kora Danab Hennie van Wyk of the Xoraxoukhoe Khoisan Indigenous Peoples’ Organization in an interview in 2013 (Majavu 2013) and in a memo issued by a group of Khoisan activists for president Zuma that demands a “full review of all land-rights claims submitted by our people and the proper and sustainable implementation of all agreements relating to settled claims” (The Guardian 2010). [1996-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* On several occasions the Khoisans have voiced their claim for the entire territory of South Africa. “We are claiming the whole of South Africa”, said Chief !Kora Danab Hennie van Wyk of the Xoraxoukhoe Khoisan Indigenous Peoples’ Organization (Majavu 2013). This is confirmed by several other sources, such as Verbuyst (2016). However, this claim can only be symbolic. Much more frequent are claims for the “restitution of traditional lands” (Garman 2001). However, it is unclear what specific areas these claims are linked to. We therefore flag this territorial claim as ambiguous and code it based on the group’s settlement area according to the World Language Mapping System (GMI 2015).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* No separatist violence was found, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Khoisan, which have the oldest known human DNA, were the first inhabitants of southern Africa. With the arrival of European settlers, the Hoisan population, which had previously lived around the Cape and along the southwestern and western coasts, was displaced into the most arid and remote areas. Their displacement by the Boer trekkers was heavily resisted (Marks 1972; Wright 1971).
* The 1913 Natives Land Act enforced racial segregation as it prohibited blacks from owning or renting land outside certain areas designated to them by the colonial government (only 3% of the Union’s land mass). The act did not directly affect the Khoisans as they had already been dispossessed of most of their land before 1913 (Guardian 2010; Le Fleur and Jansen 2013).
* During the apartheid period, which most Khoisan describe as “extraordinarily humiliating”, the Khoisan were forced into the racial category of the “Black”, which made it very hard for them to maintain their identity as an indigenous community with a distinct ethnic composition. Khoisan were socially and politically invisible (Le Fleur and Jansen 2013). The 1983 South African constitution established the Tricameral Parliament that also gave some limited political voice to the Colored population. The new parliament consisted of the House of Assembly (White representatives), the House of Representatives (Colored representatives), and the House of Delegates (Indian representatives). Each chamber was granted jurisdiction over matters such as health and education with regard to the community it represents. Clearly, the representation of the Indian and Colored population was “largely cosmetic” and real power remained concentrated in the hands of the White minority (South African History Online). The establishment of a parliamentary chamber for the Coloreds is largely window dressing and since the Khoisan only made up a very small percentage of the Colored’s (0.4%) anyway, we do not code this as a concession.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Section 6 of the 1996 constitution lists the eleven languages that were declared official languages of South Africa. Khoisan languages were not included but it was stated in the same section that “a Pan South African Language Board established by national legislation must promote, and create conditions for, the development and use of […] the Khoi, Nama and San languages.” The Pan South African Language Board (PanSALB) later established the Khoisan National Language Board (KSNLB), an organization aimed at promoting the Khoisan languages. However, whereas the KSNLB “has fallen short of meeting its expressed aims”, the PanSALB “has since almost nearly ceased to exist” and the constitutional provision did not lead to any legislative and institutional measures to protect the Khoisan languages (Le Fleur and Jansen 2013). We do not code a concession.
* The 1996 constitution (Chapter 12), recognized the authority of traditional leaders and customary law. These were allowed to function within the framework of the of the country’s new legal system. Courts were asked to, whenever applicable, apply customary law. The Khoisan, however, were not included in this legislative framework. There have been ongoing discussions since with the goals to include the Khoisan’s historical leadership in the traditional leadership constitutional framework. For this purpose, Nelson Mandela in 1999 established the National Khoi-San Council (NKC), a negotiation forum to address the constitutional accommodation of the Khoisans. However, “the NKC continues to find itself in ‘negotiations’ with government with no meaningful progress made” (Le Fleur and Jansen 2013: 3).
* Section 25(7) of the 1996 constitution provides for the restitution of land rights to persons and communities that were dispossessed of their land as a result of the Natives Land Act of 1913 (see above). This section was the follow-up of the Restitution of land rights Act 22 of 1994. The Khoisans did not benefit from this provision as they were dispossessed from their land already prior to 1913 (Majavu 2013). After long negotiations, in 2014, South African president Zuma signed the Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act, which allowed the Khoi and San people to lodge claims on land lost prior to 1913 (Custom Contested; South African Government 2014). (Le Fleur and Jansen 2013). [2014: autonomy concession]
* In 2010, the National Traditional Affairs Bill (later Traditional and Khoi-San Leadership Bill) was drafted. The Bill aimed at recognizing the traditional Khoisan leadership and institutions and gave them access to justice and several government processes. The bill is seen as having “historic value since it is the first time that draft legislation includes provisions relating to the statutory recognition of the Khoi and San communities and leaders” (Eastern Cape NGO Coalition 2011). The law was passed in 2015. The Bill was made available to the pulic in 2015, signed into law by the president in 2019 and came into force in 2021 (Deochand 2022; South African Government 2019). We code 2019 as the year of concession as this is when the bill was signed into law; we treat this as a cultural rights concession because there seems to be no territorial autonomy conferred. [2019: cultural rights concession]

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Khoisans |
| *Scenario* | 1:n |
| *EPR group(s)* | San |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 56005900 |

**Power access**

* EPR codes only one of the two constituent groups, the San. According to EPR, the San are powerless throughout. We apply the same code to the Khoisan as a whole while noting that there are also grounds to code them as discriminated. Le Fleur and Jansen (2013: 6), eg, argue that the Khoisans are “seriously marginalized” from gaining access to employment opportunities and that “they are not constitutionally accommodated; nor their land rights respected; their indigenous languages are not recognized to the point of near extinction.” EPR acknowledges that the literature often describes the San as discriminated as they do not have access to power and as they struggle for their (cultural) rights. However, EPR also notes that the government “tries to secure at least partially their cultural particularities”, which is why they should not be coded as discriminated. We follow this assessment and code the Khoisans as powerless throughout. [1996-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* There is no official census data on the number of Khoisans in South Africa as they are not constitutionally recognized but are classified as “Coloreds” (Le Fleur and Jansen 2013). Information on the exact number of Khoisans is hard to find. An estimated number of 100,000 Khoisan speakers in all of Africa was released in 2014, when several newspaper articles wrote about how Khoisans were members of the largest population on the planet some tens of thousands of years ago (Gibbons 2014). According to EPR, which only codes the San but not the Khoikhoi or the Khoisans as a whole, there are approximately 7,500 San in South Africa. The number of Khoikhoi in South Africa and Namibia is believed to be “well below 20,000” (Encyclopedia of World Cultures 1996). Lacking more specific information, we assume that there are around 10,000 Khoikhoi in South Africa. Combined with the 7,500 San, and in relation to the entire population of South Africa in 2012, we code a group size of 0.0003. [0.0003]

**Regional concentration**

* It is difficult to get by reliable estimates regarding territorial concentration. One source is EPR which codes the San as concentrated in the northernmost corner of the Northern Cape province. According to Minority Rights Group International, there are two main San communities in South Africa, with the larger one comprising almost 90% of the San population in the country. We can thus assume that, at least for the San, the higher threshold applied in this dataset compared to EPR is fulfilled. We lack evidence on the settlement patterns of the Khoikoi, but based on this we tentatively code the Khoisan as concentrated. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR codes the San in Namibia and Botswana as kin groups of the Sans. However, since Khoisan group in the entire Southern Africa is not larger than 100,000 people (Gibbons 2014), we do not code kin. [no kin]

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## Namibians

Activity: 1959-1990

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Both major national liberation movements, the South West Africa National Union (SWANU) and South West Africa Peoples’ Organization (SWAPO) were formed in 1959, hence the start date of the movement. Separatist armed conflict broke out in 1966 and continued until 1990. Namibia became fully independent from South Africa in 1990, hence the end date of the movement (Banks et al. 1997; Gibson 1972; UCDP/PRIO). [start date: 1959; end date: 1990]

**Dominant claim**

* Most sources state that the South West Africa Peoples’ Organization (SWAPO), the dominant nationalist organization, claimed independence from the start. According to Encyclopedia Britannica, SWAPO “advocated immediate Namibian independence”, which is also stated on the homepage of SWAPO itself. Dobell (2000: 28) writes that SWAPO initially claimed “the termination of colonial rule and self-governance for South-West Africa”. The other self-determination organization, the South West Africa National Union (SWANU), which was also formed in 1959, also demanded independence (Dobell 2000: 32). [1959-1990: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1959; end date: 1990]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Namibians corresponds to present-day Namibia. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* LVIOLSD coding for 1966-1976 follows UCDP/PRIO. HVIOLSD coding for 1977-1989 follows Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). [1959-1965: NVIOLSD; 1966-1976: LVIOLSD; 1977-1989: HVIOLSD; 1990: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* In 1884, and against fierce resistance from the natives, Namibia was occupied and colonized by the German Empire (German South West Africa). After the First World War, Namibia was mandated to South Africa by the League of Nations. When the League of Nations was dissolved and the newly formed United Nations wanted to bring all former German colonies under the direct responsibility of the United Nations, South Africa refused to surrender its mandate. Although Namibia was never officially incorporated into South Africa, it was de-facto administered by Pretoria (Dobell 2000).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* According to Encyclopedia Britannica, there was a "forced removal (with violence and deaths) of black Namibians from the Old Location in Windhoek to the outlying township of Katatura (sometimes translated as “The Place We Do Want to Be”)" in 1966, which proved a key catalytic event for the onset of rebellion. [1966: autonomy restriction]
* When South Africa came to realize the inevitability of Namibian independence, it set up the Turnhalle Conference in 1975 in an attempt to ensure that independence would be achieved under its own terms. Representatives from 11 groups participated, including Whites. Only actors South Africa approved of were invited; in particular, the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO), which had been recognized by the UN General Assembly as the ‘sole legitimate representative’ of Namibia's people, was excluded. The Turnhalle Conference produced a draft constitution (also called the Turnhalle Plan) and set December 31, 1978, as the date for independence. The draft constitution foresaw 11 separate ethnic entities which would have perpetuated White domination. The draft was widely rejected, in particular by the UN and SWAPO (Saunders 2008). In 1997, South Africa’s ruling National Party launched the Turnhalle Plan referendum in which only Whites with a South African passport were entitled to vote. Upon a turnout of 65%, almost 95% of Namibian White voters agreed to the Turnhalle plan. Due to pressure from the UN Security Council, the Turnhalle Plan was never enacted. We do not code a concession due to the highly discriminatory nature of the independence plan.
* The United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 was adopted in 1978. The resolution declared that South Africa had to withdraw its troops from Namibia. Furthermore, the resolution proposed free elections which ultimately should lead to independence. South Africa (and the United States) made the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola a condition for accepting the resolution and withdrawing from Namibia. This condition was fulfilled when the Tripartite Accord (New York Accords) between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa was signed in December 1988. The accord ended Cuban presence in Angola and granted Namibia independence (George 2004). First elections were held in 1989 and SWAPO won 57% of the votes. [1988: independence concession]

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1990: independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Namibians |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Blacks |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 56005000 |

**Power access**

* EPR codes 12 groups in post-independence Namibia. Apart from the Whites (6.3% of the Namibian population) and the Coloreds (3.9%), all groups were subsumed under a single umbrella group of Blacks. Since both Coloreds and Blacks (hence 93.7% of the Namibian population) are coded as discriminated until 1989 and powerless in 1990 (which is also the end of the Namibian movement), we apply this status to the entire Namibian movement (with the exception of 1989, where we code the Namibians as powerless, given that the preparations for independence had already started). This discrimination coding until 1988 is supported by (Dugard and Reynolds 2013: 877), who write that “most of the discriminatory and repressive laws of the apartheid legal order were extended to South West Africa.” [1959-1988: discriminated] [1989-1990: powerless]

**Group size**

* Group size estimates for (black) Namibians before the secession are difficult to get by, thus we draw on post-independence figures. According to EPR, Blacks make up about 85% of the Namibian population (counting all groups except for Whites, Coloreds, and Basters (another Colored group). Using the WB population estimates for South Africa (35.2 mio) and Namibia (1.415 mio.) as a baseline, this suggests the following group size estimate. [0.0328]

**Regional concentration**

* The Namibians self-determination movement (claimed to) represent almost the entire Namibian population, so we code them as regionally concentrated. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR codes several groups in post-independence Namibia. For some of them (Ovambo, San, Herero), EPR-TEK codes kin groups in other countries. However, the kin group of one small fraction of the Namibian self-determination group cannot be seen as a kin group of the entire self-determination group. Kin groups of the San (2.9%, or Herero (5.9%) are thus not coded here. However, because the Ovambo, which make up 50% of the entire Namibian population, which were the dominant group in the Namibian self-determination struggle and which have a very large kin group in Angola (Ovimbundu-Ovambo), we code ethnic kin. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Ndebele

Activity: 1982-1988

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* KwaNdebele was granted internal self-governance in 1981 by the South African government (Bantu Homelands Constitution Act). In 1982, Simon Skosana, the chief minister of KwaNdebele, declared that KwaNdebele would seek to become fully independent from South Africa by December 11, 1986. However, in August 1986, KwaNdebele’s Legislative Assembly voted against his plan (AP News 1986; The CRW Flags 2019).
* This did not end the movement, however. On May 6, 1987, the KwaNdebele Legislative Assembly voted to begin negotiations with the South African government over secession (The Washington Post 1987; Phatlane 2002, 414).
* In September 1988, the South African government decreed that the KwaNdebele Legislative Assembly should dissolve on November 1 and that new elections be held. In the elections, the KwaNdebele public expressed a strong anti-independence mood and anti-independence candidates won all seats. This appears to have ended the movement (Phatlane 2002; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Minahan 2002). [start date: 1982; end date: 1988]

**Dominant claim**

* The question of whether KwaNdebele should become independent was highly disputed among the Ndebele and even caused violent clashes between proponents and opponents. Nevertheless, there is no indication of a claim that is different from outright independence and hence independence is coded as the claim throughout. [1982-1988: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1982; end date: 1988]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Ndebele is their homeland KwaNdebele in South Africa, which is now part of the Mpumalanga province. We code this claim based on Roth (2015: 288).

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In 1982, the chief minister of KwaNdebele declared that the self-governing homeland would seek to become independent in 1986. This statement of intent, which also lacked majority support, does not constitute a declaration in the sense emplopyed here, which is why we do not code it.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Between 1985 and 1986 clashes in KwaNdebele cost over 2,000 lives. The violence continued in 1987, but the number of deaths is unclear. This violence was, however, largely an internal conflict between opponents of independence and the KwaNdebele government (The New York Times 1987; SAPA 1996). We do not, therefore, flag this period as violence over self-determination, which would require separatists to fight against the South African state. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Under the apartheid system up to the 1970s, the Ndebele had not enjoyed administrative authority or provision of land and were distributed across the Transvaal province and sections of the Bophuthatswana and Lebowa homelands (Bantustans).
* Two regional authorities (Ndzundza and Mnyamana) were established for Ndebele groups in 1974 and 1977 and were then merged to form the Ndebele Territorial Authority later in 1977 (Abel 1995). We code concessions but note that this is ambiguous because the establishment of the Bantustans predominantly served the purpose of making South Africa a republic in which only white people featured as citizens, and because actual autonomy was highly limited. [1974, 1977: autonomy concession]
* In addition, we code an autonomy restriction because of the mass deportations of Ndebeles, in line with the codebook. [1974: autonomy restriction]
* In 1981, KwaNdebele was declared a self-governing territory (Minahan 2002; Hewitt and Cheetham 2000). We code a concession but note that this is ambiguous because the establishment of the Bantustans predominantly served the purpose of making South Africa a republic in which only white people featured as citizens, and because actual autonomy was highly limited. [1981: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

NA

**Regional autonomy**

* The homelands and the policy of separate development served the purpose of making South Africa a republic in which only white people featured as citizens. Independence was thus encouraged by the racist central government as it reduced the number of black South African citizens. The establishment of self-government in the homelands deprived its black South African residents of almost all their rights as South African citizens, which made some of them oppose the granting of autonomy or independence (Egerö 1991; Beinart and Dubow 1995). Given the discriminatory nature of the apartheid regime and the economic dependence of the homelands on the central state, the quasi-independence or the self-government status of the homelands is not coded as regional autonomy.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial change**

NA

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Ndebele |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Blacks |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 56005000 |

**Power access**

* During apartheid EPR codes a single umbrella group of Blacks and does not distinguish between different black groups making their own claims for self-determination. The Ndebele are also subsumed under this umbrella group and thus do not have their separate power status for their period of activity. Nevertheless, the power status of the EPR group ‘Blacks’ (discriminated) can be applied to the Ndebele as well, given the discriminatory stance of the apartheid regime against all black South African citizens (Minahan 2002: 2117; Beinart & Dubow 1995) and the fact that the Ndebele were deported to KwaNdebele and encouraged to opt for independence, which eventually would have deprived them of South African citizenship. [1982-1988: discriminated]

**Group size**

* Regarding group size, we follow EPR, which lists black groups separately after apartheid, and according to which Ndebele make up around 1.5% of the South African population. We adjust this estimate because Namibia was still part of South Africa at the time. Using the WB population estimates for South Africa (35.2 mio) and Namibia (1.415 mio.) in 1990 as a baseline and assuming there were no Ndebele in Namibia, this yields an estimate of 1.44%. [0.0144]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minhahan (2002: 1340), the Ndebele are concentrated in the northwestern part of South Africa, though he does not give exact figures. GeoEPR codes the Ndebele as “regionally based”, though they employ a lower threshold (group has to make up only 25% of the regional bases’ population). It proved difficult to find better evidence. An internet search suggested that there are multiple geographically separated types of Ndebele groups. The two largest settlements are roughly in the same area, and both appear to have a regional base where the Ndebele language dominates. They are not, however, spatially contiguous, at least according to the 2011 census (<https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/08/South_Africa_2011_Ndebele_speakers_proportion_map.svg>). [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1340) there are more than 2.5 million Ndebeles in Zimbabwe and around 300,000 Ndebele in neighboring Botswana. EPR also codes kin in Zimbabwe. [ethnic kin in adjoining country]

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## Tswana

Activity: 1973-1994

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* A homeland (i.e., Bantustan) for the Tswana people of South Africa, Bophuthatswana, was set up in. At the first summit of the eight homeland leaders in 1973, the leader of Bophuthatswana expressed a preference for links with Botswana, rather than an independent federation of the homelands. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1973.
* In 1975 a meeting of Tswana chiefs and headmen called for independence and this was followed by supportive resolutions passed by the Bophuthatswana National Party and the legislative assembly. During negotiation between the South African government and the ANC about the constitution for a post-apartheid state, Bophuthatswana’s political leaders called for Bophuthatswana to remain independent, but it was reincorporated into South Africa in 1994, hence the end date of the movement (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Keesing’s). [start date: 1973; end date: 1994]

**Dominant claim**

* At the first summit of the eight homeland leaders in 1973, the leader of Bophuthatswana expressed a preference for links with Botswana, rather than an independent federation of the homelands (Kotzé 1975: 234; Hewitt and Cheetham 2000). [1973-1975: irredentist claim]
* In 1975, a meeting of Tswana chiefs and headmen called for independence and this was followed by supportive resolutions passed by the Bophuthatswana National Party and the legislative assembly. The claim for independence remained the dominant claim. During negotiation between the South African government and the ANC about the constitution for a post-apartheid state, Bophuthatswana’s political leaders also called for Bophuthatswana to remain independent (Mompei 1994; Hewitt and Cheetham 2000). [1976-1994: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1975; end date: 1994]

**Irredentist claims**

* See above. [start date: 1973; end date: 1975]

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Tswana was the Republic of Bophuthatswana, a scattered patchwork of eight enclaves spread across the former Cape Province, Orange Free State, and Transvaal. We code this claim based on a map by Ali (2016).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no evidence of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Tswana migrated from East Africa to South Africa (Western Transvaal) in about 1600. Due to famines and wars with the Zulu empire in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, many Tswana migrated, forming new settlements and several Tswana subgroups (Encyclopedia Britannica). The Tswana territory was occupied first by the Boers in 1837 and – after the discovery of diamonds and increasing British interest in the territory - was later divided among the Cape Colony, Afrikaner republics, and British territories (Mompei 1994; South Africa History Online).
* When the Tswana territory was incorporated into the Union of South Africa in 1910, the Tswana chiefs lost most of their remaining power. Tswana were forced to pay taxes to the British Crown (South Africa History Online).
* The 1913 Natives Land Act enforced racial segregation as it prohibited blacks from owning or renting land outside certain areas designated to them by the colonial government (only 3% of the Union’s land mass). The Act allocated 3,754,018 hectares to the Tswana (Mompei 1994: 105).
* Within the framework of the “homeland policy”, a homeland for the Tswana (Bophuthatswana) was set up in 1971. We code a concession but note that this is ambiguous because the establishment of the Bantustans predominantly served the purpose of making South Africa a republic in which only white people featured as citizens. [1971: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1976, the land allocated to the Tswana through the Natives Land Act of 1913 was increased from 3,754,018 to 4,043,000 hectares. However, at the same time as the Bophuthatswana territory was extended, many Tswana were forcibly removed from outside this territory into Bophuthatswana (Mompei 1994: 105). [1976: autonomy concession; autonomy restriction]
* In 1977, Bophuthatswana was granted political independence (Republic of Bophuthatswana) by the South African government but no other nation recognized it. We do not code a concession since the underlying purpose of this move was the expatriation of black citizens. Homelands and the policy of separate development served the purpose of making South Africa a republic in which only white people featured as citizens. Self-government and independence was thus encouraged by the racist central government as it reduced the number of black South African citizens. The establishment of self-government in the homelands deprived its black South African residents of almost all their rights as South African citizens (Egerö 1991; Beinart and Dubow 1995). Mompei (1994: 106) furthermore states that despite independence, the Republic of South Africa “still regarded itself as being responsible for the maintenance of law and order in Bophuthatswana”. This was thus no genuine independence.
* The 1993 interim constitution dissolved Bophuthatswana and reincorporated it into South Africa. The various enclaves of Bophuthatswana became parts of provinces of the North West Province, Free State and Mpumalanga (Encyclopedia Britannica). The various enclaves of Bophuthatswana became parts of [Orange Free State](https://www.britannica.com/place/Orange-Free-State) (now Free State) and the North-West and [Eastern Transvaal](https://www.britannica.com/place/Mpumalanga) (now Mpumalanga) (Encyclopedia Britannica). South Africa adopted a federal structure, and since the Tswana-speakers make up 62% of the North West Province, we code an autonomy concession. [1993: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* The homelands and the policy of separate development served the purpose of making South Africa a republic in which only white people featured as citizens. Independence was thus encouraged by the racist central government as it reduced the number of black South African citizens. The establishment of self-government in the homelands deprived its black South African residents of almost all their rights as South African citizens (Egerö 1991; Beinart and Dubow 1995). Given the discriminatory nature of the apartheid regime and the economic dependence of the homelands on the central state, the quasi-independence or the self-government status of the homelands is thus very far from the concept of regional autonomy we are interested in.
* We would code autonomy from 1995 onwards due to the 1994 concession, but the movement ends in 1994.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* The interim constitution entered into force in 1994. The establishment of provinces gave the Tswana significant regional autonomy because the majority of the North West Province residents are Tswana people (see above). [1994: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Tswana |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Blacks |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 56005000 |

**Power access**

* During apartheid EPR codes a single umbrella group of Blacks and does not distinguish between different black groups making their own claims for self-determination (hence a n:1 scenario). The Tswana are also subsumed under this umbrella group and thus do not have their separate power status for their period of activity. Nevertheless, the power status of the EPR group ‘Blacks’ (discriminated until 1989 and powerless from 1990-1994) can be applied to the Tswana as well, given the discriminatory stance of the apartheid regime against all black South African citizens and the official abolishment of all discriminatory laws in 1990 (Beinart & Dubow 1995). [1973-1989: discriminated; 1990-1994: powerless]

**Group size**

* Regarding group size, we follow EPR, which lists black groups separately after apartheid, and according to which the Tswana make up around 8% of the South African population. We adjust this estimate for the period when Namibia was still part of South Africa. Using the WB population estimates for South Africa (35.2 mio) and Namibia (1.415 mio.) in 1990 as a baseline and assuming there were no Tswanas in Namibia (which appears justified based on EPR), this yields the following group size estimate for 1973-1990. [1973-1990: .0769; 1991-1994: 0.08]

**Regional concentration**

* GeoEPR codes the Tswana as concentrated, though they employ a lower threshold (group has to make up only 25% of the regional bases’ population). It proved difficult to find better evidence. An internet search suggested that there are eight geographically separated settlements of Tswana groups, which together made up Bophuthatswana (see Encyclopedia Britannica 2009). While the Tswana made up the majority in these settlements (according to Hewitt and Cheetham (2000), they made up two thirds of the population in Bophuthatswana), we do not code regional concentration since the territory is not spatially contiguous. [not regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR codes a large kin group (Tswana) in Botswana. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Xhosa

Activity: 1963-1994

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Xhosa had two Bantustans (homelands) under Apartheid South Africa, Ciskei and Transkei, which were separated from each other by a narrow strip of white-owned land). Transkei became nominally self-governing in 1963 and from then the Transkei National Independence Party worked for greater political autonomy. 1963 is coded as start date.
* Transkei declared itself independent in 1976, which was recognized by South Africa but no other state.
* Ciskei, on the other hand, declared independence in 1981 after a 1980 a referendum initiated by the ruling Ciskei National Independence Party upon pressure by South Africa.
* Many of the leaders of the Anti-Apartheid movement came from Ciskei, including Nelson Mandela and Steve Biko. Both Ciskei and Transkei were reincorporated into South Africa in 1994, hence the end date of the self-determination movement (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000; Keesing’s). [start date: 1963; end date: 1994]

**Dominant claim**

* In a referendum in Ciskei, initiated by the ruling Ciskei National Independence Party in 1980, 98.7% voted in favor of independence for Ciskei (turnout was approximately 60%). This was also the position of the Ciskei National Independence Party that dominated Ciskeian politics until 1990 (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000). The situation was slightly different in Transkei. Although the independence-advocating Transkei National Independence Party dominated Transkei politics, Hewitt and Cheetham (2000) argue that elections in Transkei were not a good indicator for the support for independence due to a low turnout (e.g. only 30% in 1976) and the harassment of opposition parties. However, overall independence seems to be the dominant claim. [1963-1994: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1963; end date: 1994]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Xhosa were the Transkei and Ciskei homelands situated mainly in the former Cape Province with parts of Transkei covering the Natal province (Encyclopedia Britannica). We code this claim based on Ali (2016).

**Sovereignty declarations**

* Transkei and Ciskei declared independence in 1976 and 1981 respectively. However, these declarations were invited (under pressure) by the South African government for the purpose of expatriating black citizens under apartheid policies. These are therefore no unilateral sovereignty declarations.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* After centuries of migration and internal friction, the Xhosa eventually settled in the area along the eastern coast between the Groot-Vis river and present-day KwaZulu-Natal and inland to the Drakensberg Mountains (Stokes et al. 2009: 741).
* In the 18th and 19th century, the Xhosa fought a series of wars (Xhosa Wars) against the European settlers to preserve their independence and land until they were finally defeated by the British and brought under white rule in 1878 (Minorities at Risk).
* When the Xhosa territory was incorporated in the Union of South Africa in 1910, the Xhosa chiefs lost most of their remaining power. The 1913 Natives Land Act enforced racial segregation as it prohibited blacks from owning or renting land outside certain areas designated to them by the colonial government (only 3% of the Union’s land mass).
* The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 made provision for the establishment of Regional and Territorial Authorities for each specific black ethnic groups in their allocated habitat. Tribal Authorities were set up and positions were given to Chiefs and Headman who became responsible for the local affairs (SAHO 2012).
* Under the Bantu Authorities Act, the South African government declared Transkei and Ciskei administratively separate territories within South Africa in 1959 and 1961, respectively (Encyclopedia Britannica 2009; SAHO 2011a; SAHO 2011b). We code a concession but note that this is ambiguous because the establishment of such administratively separate territories predominantly served the purpose of making South Africa a republic in which only white people featured as citizens, and because actual autonomy was highly limited. [1959: autonomy concession; 1961: autonomy concession]
* Under the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, Transkei was granted nominal autonomy by the South African government in 1963. A [Legislative Assembly](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Legislative-Assembly-France-1791-1792) was introduced, all of whose actions, however, had to be approved by South Africa (Encyclopedia Britannica; SAHO 2011a). We code a concession but note that this is ambiguous because the establishment of the Bantustans predominantly served the purpose of making South Africa a republic in which only white people featured as citizens, and because actual autonomy was highly limited. Note: the above narrative suggests that the concession was made before the SDM’s start date. [1963: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Ciskei was granted nominal autonomy by South Africa in 1972 (Encyclopedia Britannica 2009; SAHO 2011b). We code a concession but note that this is ambiguous because the establishment of the Bantustans predominantly served the purpose of making South Africa a republic in which only white people featured as citizens, and because actual autonomy was highly limited. [1972: autonomy concession]
* Transkei was granted political independence in 1976 (Republic of Transkei), which was only recognized by South Africa but no other state. We do not code a concession since the underlying purpose of this move was the expatriation of black citizens. Homelands and the policy of separate development served the purpose of making South Africa a republic in which only white people featured as citizens. Self-government and independence was thus encouraged by the racist central government as it reduced the number of black South African citizens. The establishment of self-government in the homelands deprived its black South African residents of almost all their rights as South African citizens (Egerö 1991; Beinart and Dubow 1995). Mompei (1994: 106) furthermore states that despite independence, the Republic of South Africa “still regarded itself as being responsible for the maintenance of law and order” in all Bantustans. This was thus no genuine independence.
* After Transkei’s independence, Cieskei was granted political independence in 1981 (Republic of Ciskei) after a 1980 a referendum initiated by the ruling Ciskei National Independence Party upon pressure by South Africa. Following the same rationale as above, we do not code a concession. This was not genuine independence.
* There were mass deportations of Xhosa to both Ciskei and Transkei (see Human Rights Watch 1991). It is not entirely clear when the forced removals started, but Human Rights Watch (1991) states that the largest of these deportations took place in 1976, when 50,000 people were moved to newly “independent” Transkei. In line with the codebook, we code the forced relocations as an autonomy restriction. [1976: autonomy restriction]
* The 1993 interim constitution dissolved Ciskei and Transkei and reincorporated them into South Africa as part of the Eastern Cape province. The new constitution gave the provinces significant competencies (Dickovick 2007). Since the Xhosa made up a large majority in the Eastern Cape province (around 78% Xhosa speakers as of 2011 census), the new federal set-up provided them with significant self-determination. [1993: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* The homelands and the policy of separate development served the purpose of making South Africa a republic in which only white people featured as citizens. Independence was thus encouraged by the racist central government as it reduced the number of black South African citizens. The establishment of self-government in the homelands deprived its black South African residents of almost all their rights as South African citizens (Egerö 1991; Beinart and Dubow 1995). Given the discriminatory nature of the apartheid regime and the economic dependence of the homelands on the central state, the quasi-independence or the self-government status of the homelands is thus very far from the concept of regional autonomy we are interested in.
* Autonomy is given from 1994 onwards, but given the 1st of January rule, we would only code autonomy from 1995, when the movement was no longer active.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* The interim constitution entered into force in 1994, and this gave the Xhosa significant regional autonomy (see above). [1994: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Xhosa |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Blacks |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 56005000 |

**Power access**

* During apartheid EPR codes a single umbrella group of Blacks and does not distinguish between different black groups making their own claims for self-determination (hence a n:1 scenario). The Xhosa are also subsumed under this umbrella group and thus do not have their separate power status for their period of activity. Nevertheless, the power status of the EPR group ‘Blacks’ (discriminated until 1989 and powerless from 1990-1994) can be applied to the Xhosa as well, given the discriminatory stance of the apartheid regime against all black South African citizens and the official abolishment of all discriminatory laws in 1990 (Beinart & Dubow 1995). [1963-1989: discriminated] [1990-1994: powerless]

**Group size**

* Regarding group size, we follow EPR, which lists black groups separately after apartheid, and according to which the Xhosa make up around 18% of the South African population. We adjust this estimate for the period when Namibia was still part of South Africa. Using the WB population estimates for South Africa (35.2 mio) and Namibia (1.415 mio.) in 1990 as a baseline and assuming there were no Xhosa in Namibia (which appears justified based on EPR), this yields the following group size estimate for 1963-1990. [1963-1990: 0.173; 1991-1994: 0.18]

**Regional concentration**

* During movement activity, most Xhosa lived in one of the two Xhosa bantustans, Transkei and Ciskei. According to Butler, Rotberg and Adams (1978), there were 1,650,825 Xhosa in Transkei and 509,607 Xhosa in Ciskei in 1973. In either case, this means that less than 50% of the total Xhosa population of 3,930,087 lived there.However, the two bantustans are close, so it is likely that the criterion is met. Additional evidence comes from GeoEPR, which codes the Xhosa as concentrated, though based on a lower threshold (group has to make up only 25% of the regional bases’ population). MAR V also codes the Xhosa as territorially concentrated while noting that between 50-75% of group members live in the regional base. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR does not code ethnic kin. According to MAR V, the Xhosa have close kindred in one country which adjoins its regional base. The Xhosa in Namibia, however, only number 33,000 (Joshua Project), which is too small to be considered here. [no kin]

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## Zulus

Activity: 1970-2004

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Initially the Zulu resisted South Africa’s Apartheid/Bantustan policy, but eventually had to give in. In 1970, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the leader of Zulu dissidents and a member of Zulu royalty, was elected chief executive officer of the Zulu Bantustan (KwaZulu). According to Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 165), Buthelezi promptly “called on South Africa to give the Zulu more land and resources” (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 165). Thus, 1970 is coded as start date.
* In 1975, Buthelezi formed the Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement (later Inkatha Freedom Party, IFP). Buthelezi continued to make claims for an autonomous and enlargened Zulu state (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 165; also see Minahan 1996, 2002; MAR).
* In 1994, King Goodwill Zwelithini declared KwaZulu a sovereign state, following a demonstration in Durban for Zulu independence one month before (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Minahan 2002).
* After the dismantling of apartheid in 1994, the Zulus and in particular the IFP continued to make claims for greater self-rule or even independence (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Minahan 2002).
* The movement ended in the early 2000s. The IFP had dropped its demand for independence after the 1996 local elections and calls for increased autonomy largely faded after the 2004 general election. This was part of a change in political strategy on IFP’s part, which wanted to present itself as a national, non-ethnic organization (Piper 2002, 2005; Piombo 2009).
* Note: In 2007, Zuma was elected as ANC president and started presidentship of South Africa in 2009. He seemed to play a significant role in easing tensions between the Zulu public and ANC (Reuters 2007). [start date: 1970; end date: 2004]

**Dominant claim**

* We code an autonomy claim from 1970-1990 for the following reasons:
  + In 1970, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the leader of Zulu dissidents, was elected chief executive officer of the Zulu Bantustan (KwaZulu). According to Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 165), Buthelezi promptly “called on South Africa to give the Zulu more land and resources” (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 165).
  + Buthelezi continued to make claims for an autonomous and enlargened Zulu state (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 165).
  + The South African government repeatedly offered independence to KwaZulu. According to Minahan (2002), the Zulus preferred a self-governing status within the system of South-Africa which allowed them to remain citizens of the state of South Africa.
  + The 1980s brought about a split in the Zulu community between supporters of the Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement, which aims at more self-determination, and supporters of the African National Congress (ANC). The ANC did not make self-determination claims.
  + Not all IFP members favored autonomy. Some, similar to the ANC, favored greater integration into the South African system. But those that advocated self-determination generally made claims for autonomy. [1970-1990: autonomy claim]
* In the process of democratization and prior to the first free elections in South Africa in 1994, Zulu nationalism grew rapidly. The situation is complex as there were various claims within the Zulu community: in 1990, the Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement was renamed the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and listed the implementation of federalism among its main goals. Chief Buthelezi, former KwaZulu head of government and leader of the Inkatha, at various occasions however also raised the issue of KwaZulu independence and put forward the idea of a sovereign state with its own president, courts, and army. In 1994, King Goodwill Zwelithini declared KwaZulu a sovereign state, following a demonstration in Durban for Zulu independence one month before (Los Angeles Times 1994; Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Minahan 2002). The IFP dropped its demand for independence after the 1996 local elections (Piper 2002, 2005; Piombo 2009). [1991-1996: independence claim]
* Following this, the dominant claim reverted to greater autonomy and the incorporation of additional territories into Zulu state (Minahan 2002: 2119). [1997-2004: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1990; end date: 1996]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Since the end of apartheid, the Zulu movement's territorial claims clearly relate to today's KwaZulu-Natal. During apartheid, claims related in part to the KwaZulu bantustan, but already at the time Zulu leaders had demanded additional land. Therefore, we code today's KwaZulu-Natal as the claimed territory throughout. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In 1994, King Goodwill Zwelithini declared KwaZulu a sovereign state, following a demonstration in Durban for Zulu independence one month before (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Minahan 2002). [1994: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found minimal separatist violence from 1970-1983 and thus code this period NVIOLSD.
* Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019) code 1984-1994 as civil war, and their coding notes suggest that the main rebel group in that conflict was the ANC, but that other groups were involved, including the Inkatha Freedom Party. Yet, Minahan (2002: 2118) suggests that violence was mostly between the Inkatha Freedom Party, which was accused of being allies of the apartheid regime, and the ANC. This is confirmed by UCDP/PRIO, which codes a civil war between the apartheid regime and the ANC and a non-state conflict between supporters of the ANC and IFP on the other. The UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia explains that at the core of the conflict between the ANC and IFP was that while the members of the ANC participated in an armed struggle, the IFP rejected this strategy. In light of this, we do not code separatist violence. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* After a war between the British Empire and the Zulu Kingdom in 1879, the British occupied Zululand in 1882, the start of a long period of Zulu grievance and rebellion against foreign, white rule. The homeland of the Zulu was incorporated into the newly unified Union of South Africa in 1910, which previously had consisted of four separate British colonies. With the rise to power of the National Party, racial segregation – in place since Dutch colonial rule - was introduced as an official policy. Zulus, as all other black citizens of South Africa, were discriminated and restricted in movement, employment, livelihood and education (Minahan 2002).
* Within the framework of the “homeland policy” the Zulu Bantustan KwaZulu was established in 1970, followed by mass forced removals. Repeated offers of independence were refused as this would have deprived the Zulus of South African citizenship (Minahan 2002). We code a concession but note that this is ambiguous because the establishment of the Bantustans predominantly served the purpose of making South Africa a republic in which only white people featured as citizens, and because actual autonomy was highly limited. The above narrative (see movement start and end dates) suggests that SD claims were made only after the formation of the Bantustan. [1970: autonomy concession]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* After the establishment of KwaZulu, South Africa conducted mass forced removals of Zulu, forcibly relocating Zulus to KwaZulu. In line with the codebook, this is coded as an autonomy restriction. [1970: autonomy restriction]
* Following the procedures lined out in the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of 1971 the KwaZulu constitution was promulgated in 1972. It provided for an executive assembly (KwaZulu Legislative Assembly KLA) and, according to Dlamini (2005: 52), was “a major step forward in the state’s constitutional planning for the bantustans, giving limited legislative as well as executive powers to regional administrators”. In 1977, the KwaZulu homeland was granted self-government. We code a concession but note that this is ambiguous because the establishment of the Bantustans predominantly served the purpose of making South Africa a republic in which only white people featured as citizens, and because actual autonomy was highly limited. [1977: autonomy concession]
* The 1993 interim constitution gave the provinces, including KwaZulu Natal, significant comptetences, not least due to the amendment pushed through by the Inkatha Freedom Party even before the constitution has entered into force (Klug 2000: 108). In 1994 the constitution entered into force; the KwaZulu homeland was dissolved and integrated into the new province of Kwa Zulu Natal. The 1996 constitution maintained the quasi-federal structure (Dickovick 2007). Furthermore, this ended the deportation policy; Zulus were again allowed to move freely. [1993: autonomy concession]
* A controversial deal, Ingonyama Trust in terms of the KwaZulu Ingonyama Trust Act 1994, made before the 1994 elections transferred vast swaths of land to the Zulu king (Cunningham 2014: 223; MAR; Keller 1994). [1994: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* The Bantustans/homelands and the policy of separate development served the purpose of making South Africa a republic in which only white people featured as citizens. The establishment of self-government in the homelands, which deprived its black South African residents of almost all their rights as South African citizens, is thus very far from the concept of regional autonomy we are interested in. Due to this, we do not code regional autonomy before 1995.
* In 1994 the interim constitution (which devolved significant competencies to the provinces) entered into force; the KwaZulu homeland was dissolved and integrated into the new province of KwaZulu-Natal. The 1996 constitution maintained the quasi-federal structure (Dickovick 2007). We code regional autonomy from 1995 onwards in accordance with the first of January rule. [1995-2004: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial change**

* The interim constitution entered into force in 1994. [1994: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Zulus |
| *Scenario* | n:1/1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Blacks/Zulus |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 56005000/56005100 |

**Power access**

* During Apartheid, EPR codes an umbrella ‘Blacks’ group only. The power status given to the Blacks can be directly adapted, however, given the discriminatory treatment of all Blacks: discriminated in 1975-1989 and powerless in 1990-1994. From 1995 onwards, the Zulus are coded in EPR and we adopt EPR data directly. [1970-1989: discriminated; 1990-1994: powerless; 1995-2004: junior partner]

**Group size**

* The EPR group size estimate is .23. This is supported by Minahan (2002: 2114), who reports 9,220,000 Zulus in South Africa (while South Africa at the time had a population of about 44 million according to the Worldbank). We adjust this estimate for 1970-1990 because Namibia was still part of South Africa at the time. Using the WB population estimates for South Africa (35.2 mio) and Namibia (1.415 mio.) in 1990 as a baseline and assuming there were no Ndebele in Namibia, this yields an estimate of 22.11%. [1970-1990: 0.2211; 1991-2004: 0.23]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 2114), 57% of the Zulus are located in KwaZulu-Natal, where they make up more than 70% of the local population. This is consistent with information from MAR and EPR. [regionally concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are no kin groups according to EPR. However, EPR only codes kin groups that are also considered politically relevant and in countries of a certain size. MAR, on the other hand, codes “close kindred in one country which adjoins its regional base” and mentions the Zulu in Lesotho and Swaziland as the two largest kin groups. This is in line with Minahan (2002: 2114), who also mentions Zulu communities in Swaziland, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and some European countries, particularly in the United Kingdom. With 320,000 people (see Joshua Project), the Zulu community in Lesotho crosses the numeric threshold, but also Zulu communities in Zimbabwe and Swaziland would. [kin in neighboring country]

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